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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A REVIEW OF THE
ICJ’S RULING ON ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE
IRAN-U.S. TREATY OF AMITY
Seyed M. H. Razavi & Fateme Zeynodini†
Abstract: This article studies the unilateral regime of sanctions and their impact
on two fundamental human rights: the right to food and the right to health. This article
argues that international tribunals will set the level of obligation required to protect these
human rights by observing the empirical correlation between economic sanctions and the
deterioration of these rights in target states. By reviewing the elements that contribute to
the strength of punitive economic measures, this article shows how sanctions have a
greater impact on a population. This article concludes that the more powerful the
economic sanctions, the higher the level of obligation of the imposing state will be to
ensure that the sanctioned state’s population’s fundamental rights are protected.
Cite as: Seyed M. H. Razavi & Fateme Zeynodini, Economic Sanctions and Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights: A Review of the ICJ’s Ruling on Alleged Violations of the
Iran-U.S. Treaty of Amity, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 303 (2020).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Economic sanctions1 have become the most relevant instrument of
foreign policy designed to respond to a wrongful act or policy of a state,2
such as aggression,3 support of terrorism,4 involvement in internal wars,5 and

†
Seyed Mohamad Hassan Razavi is Assistant Professor at University of Tehran, Faculty of Law
and Political Science. Fateme Zeynodini is Ph.D. in Law from University of Montreal, Faculty of Law. The
authors can be contacted at hassan.razavi@ut.ac.ir.
1
See generally Thomas W. Walde, Managing the Risk of Sanctions in the Global Oil & Gas
Industry: Corporate Response under Political, Legal and Commercial Pressures, 36 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 184
(2001) (“economic sanctions” generally refer to specific punitive economic actions which goes further than
the traditional trade-based models of sanctions and includes any effective restrictive measures).
2
Jana Ilieva, Aleksandar Dashtevski, & Filip Kokotovic, Economic Sanctions in International Law,
9 UTMS J. ECON. 201, 201 (2018).
3
For example, economic sanction against Germany in 1930s. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 5 (2d ed. 1990).
4
For example, economic sanction against Libya in late 1980s and early 1990s. Id. at 16.
5
For example, economic sanctions against internal wars in Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda,
Sierra Leone and FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). Id. at 28–32.
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the violation of human rights.6 Sanctions are primarily imposed to change
the behavior of the wrongdoer state. However, they have been widely used
as an instrument to induce regime change7 or even as a complement to war.8
The increasing global interdependence associated with the flow of
goods and services has significantly increased the power of economic
sanctions, making them a potentially devastating policy for the target
country’s people. Economic sanctions, which are often designed to address
violations of civil and political rights of the wrongdoer states, instead
undermine the economic and social rights of the people living in the target
country.9
The negative humanitarian impact of economic sanctions has raised
questions on the limits to which embargoes should extend in order to punish
the wrongful deeds of a target country. This inquiry extends to whether
sanctioning states have any responsibility and the duty of care for the effects
of their prohibitive regulations and, if so, where the responsibility of
sanctioning states lies regarding the humanitarian impact of such restrictive
measures.
To address these issues, the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,10 adopted by the International Law
Commission (“ILC”) in August 2001, developed a legal framework for when
a state is held responsible for breaching an international obligation and the
adoption of countermeasures between states. Article 50(1)(b) of the Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States requires that the adoption of
countermeasures by states shall not affect “obligations for the protection of
fundamental human rights.”11 The strong language of the Article 50(1)(b)
raises a question as to the level of obligation a sanctioning state is subject to

6

See PETER WALLENSTEEN, A CENTURY OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A FIELD REVISITED 2 (2000).
Lenina Pomeranz, Economic Sanctions as a Political Instrument in International Relations, 3
REVISTA TEMPO DO MUNDO 181, 193 (2017).
8
David J. Lektzian & Christopher M. Sprecher, Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict, 51
AM. J. POL. SCI. 415, 415 (2007).
9
Amy Howlett, Getting “Smart”: Crafting Economic Sanctions That Respect All Human Rights, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2004).
10
See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, With Commentaries, Work if Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
11
Id. at 131.
7
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when ensuring that its economic countermeasures do not affect the
protection of fundamental human rights.
Similarly, the ruling of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
regarding Iran’s request for the application of provisional measures in
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and
Consular Rights (Iran v. United States), issued October 3, 2018, was a step
forward in establishing a higher level of obligation on the United States for
the extraterritorial effects of its unilateral sanctions. The ICJ found that
rights asserted by Iran under the 1955 Treaty of Amity, “so far as they relate
to the importation and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs[,]”
are plausible and not even the treaty’s national security exception can
prohibit Iran’s right to humanitarian goods.12 The ICJ went a step further,
ruling that the mere existence of specific carve-outs for humanitarian trade
in the sanctions does not release the United States from its obligations and
asked the United States to “ensure payments and other transfers of funds . . .
relat[ing] to [humanitarian] goods and services” are not restricted.13
This article consists of three main parts. First, it explains the evolution
of international law and different approaches in addressing the humanitarian
impact of economic sanctions. Second, it analyzes the elements that
contribute to the power of a sanction program. In doing so, the article sets
out a conceptual framework for a higher level of obligation to protect
fundamental human rights in the face of such powerful economic sanctions.
Finally, the third part consists of a review and analysis of the ICJ ruling
regarding Iran’s request for the indication of provisional measures following
the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”). Through examination of
the ICJ’s ruling, this article concludes that there is a higher level of
obligation on imposing states to ensure the protection of the fundamental
human rights of sanctioned states’ populations.

12
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ¶ 70 (July 16, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/175/175-20180716-REQ-01-00-EN.pdf
[hereinafter
Iranian
Provisional Measures].
13
Id. ¶ 98.
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ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND RIGHT TO FOOD AND MEDICINE

Post-Cold War developments in international law and the integration
of national economies have contributed to the increased strength and
effectiveness of economic sanctions.14 As such, economic sanctions became
a desirable and popular policy tool in the post-Cold War period.15 The
United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”), the body tasked with the
adoption of multilateral sanctions under the UN Charter, resorted to these
measures thirteen times throughout the 1990s.16 The United States was the
most frequent user of economic sanctions, sanctioning more than thirty-five
countries between 1993 and 1996.17 This evolution transformed economic
sanctions from isolated “emergency incidents” in foreign affairs to a
common feature in foreign and national security policy.18
International trade plays a key role in the realization of both the right
to food19 and health. Cross-border trade provides opportunities “to reduce
hunger and poverty in many of the developing countries.”20 In order to
provide access to adequate food and life-saving medicine, it is necessary that
these goods transfer from production sites to places of consumption.
Exportation of these essential goods from countries producing to countries
consuming them is a major element in increasing food and medicine

14
William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions, in
2 HANDBOOK OF DEFENSE ECONOMICS 868, 869 (Todd Sandler & Keith Hartley eds., 2007) (“Historically,
economic sanctions . . . were used by Napoleon in the Continental System commencing in 1806, by
Thomas Jefferson in the Embargo Act of 1807, and by the League of Nations against Italy in 1935 . . . .”).
15
See generally Joy Gordon, Economic Sanctions, Just War Doctrine, and the “Fearful Spectacle of
the Civilian Dead,” 49 CROSSCURRENTS 387 (1999).
16
See SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS, 2006–7,
HL 96-I, ¶ 17 (UK) (UNSC has “imposed sanctions against Afghanistan, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Eritrea, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, North Korea and Iran”).
17
William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, Unilateral Versus Multilateral International
Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective, 43 INT’L STUD. Q., 37, 37 (1999).
18
Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SEC. 90, 90 (1997).
19
See, e.g., Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to
Adequate Food (Art. 11), E/C.12/1999/5 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 12] (the realization of
right to food refers to the availability of food, physically and financially, either through feeding oneself
from production or international trade—i.e., movement from the production site to the place of
consumption).
20
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N., Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of
the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted Its One Hundred TwentySeventh Session, ¶ 7 (2004) [hereinafter Information and Case Studies].
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security.21 The dependence of developing and underdeveloped countries on
the importation of foodstuffs and medicines has made restrictions on access
to international markets and the free movement of goods and services an
effective strategy for the sanctioning state to achieve its foreign policy goals
with significant negative consequences.22
The sanctioning countries have treated the trade of humanitarian
goods (food and medicine) differently in their various sanction programs
since World War II. This differential treatment is mainly due to differing
views of sanctions—some countries regarded them as a full and efficient
alternative to military intervention, while others viewed them as a mere
instrument of foreign policy, just one part of a forced escalation curve.23 The
most extreme position taken included using punitive measures with regards
to the trade of food and medicine and the silence of sanction regulation on
permissibility of trade of humanitarian goods.
Punitive measures on humanitarian goods were manifested in forms,
such as the sanctioning nation removing food aid24 and refusing to grant
credit for purchasing food and medicine.25 These forms of sanctions have a
devastating impact on countries which depend largely on the flow of
humanitarian aid to their territories, or on the grant of credit for their food
and medicine industries.26
The structure of restrictive measures gradually moved from silence on
humanitarian goods toward the inclusion of a specific carve-out for
humanitarian goods in the sanction regulations. An explicit exemption was
made by the UNSC to exclude medical supplies and foodstuffs when

21
See World Food Summit, Rome Declaration on World Food Security ¶ 37 (1996) [hereinafter
Rome Declaration].
22
See generally KAMAL MALHOTRA ET AL., MAKING GLOBAL TRADE WORK FOR PEOPLE (2003).
23
Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime,
75 CALIF. 1159, 1169 n.20 (1987) (U.S. President Woodrow Wilson stated: “a nation that is boycotted is a
nation that is in sight of surrender. Apply this economic, peaceful, silent, deadly remedy and there will be
no need for force. It is a terrible remedy. It does not cost a life outside the nation boycotted, but it brings a
pressure upon the nation which, in my judgment, no modern nation could resist.”).
24
See, e.g., HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 3, at 458 (U.S. sanctions against the Nicaraguan Sandinista
government included the withdrawal of food assistance).
25
Howlett, supra note 9, at 1218 (for example, the United States’ refusal to grant Poland $740
million of credit to buy U.S. corn caused domestic food shortages due to the Polish poultry industry’s
dependence on U.S. feed corn).
26
Howlett, supra note 9, at 1217.
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sanctioning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).27
Regarding unilateral state-to-state sanctions, the U.S. embargoes against
Nicaragua and Haiti also provided for similar exemptions.28
A humanitarian crisis occurred when the UNSC imposed
comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. The UNSC resolution provided an
explicit exemption for “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, and,
in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs,”29 and a subsequent exclusion for
foodstuffs from the application of trade prohibitions in another resolution.30
However, the comprehensive nature of the economic sanctions against
Iraq following the 1991 Persian Gulf War destroyed almost the entirety of
Iraq’s infrastructure. It dramatically reduced the importation of food and
caused an exhaustion of food stockpiles, which led to the implementation of
food rationing in Iraq. The twenty-five-fold increase in prices of nonrationed food and the shortfall in production led to massive malnutrition
amongst the population. The destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure had an
impact on health care; diseases spread due to contaminated water, severe
malnutrition increased, and there was a lack of access to primary health care
and life-saving medicines.31 The imposition of comprehensive economic
sanctions has been seen as a form of collective punishment on civilian
populations. Some scholars have compared this to blowing up an airplane
containing innocent passengers to kill a terrorist,32 or killing cells
indiscriminately to kill a cancer.33
III.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS

The mere imposition of unilateral economic sanctions, irrespective of
the existence of a bilateral or multilateral commitment, would not be in

27

S.C. Res. 757, ¶ 4(c) (May 30, 1992).
Richard Garfield, Julia Devin, & Joy Fausey, The Health Impact of Economic Sanctions, 72
BULLETIN OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF MEDICINE 454, 458–62 (1995).
29
S.C. Res. 661, ¶ 3(c) (Aug. 6, 1990).
30
S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 20 (Apr. 3, 1991).
31
Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 464–65.
32
Howlett, supra note 9, at 1217.
33
Id.
28
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breach of an obligation under general international law.34 According to the
ICJ, “[a] state is not bound to continue particular trade relations longer than
it sees fit to do so.”35 In this context, the traditional Westphalian approach to
international public law considers the wrongdoer state responsible for a
violation of international law. As such, the consequences of such a violation
impact its own population.
However, with the development of human rights and international
treaties, the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions has come under
scrutiny. From a human rights perspective, the ideal situation is that states
avoid imposing any unilateral measure which “impedes the full achievement
of economic and social development by the populations of the affected
countries.”36 The humanitarian analysis of economic sanctions has raised the
question as to whether a sanctioning state has any responsibility and duty of
care for the indirect effects of its prohibitive regulations.37
The early efforts of international legal scholars and writers have
focused on drawing analogies with laws applicable to war conditions.38 They
believed that the effects of economic blockades imposed on a population
was comparable to wartime blockades under the law of armed conflicts. This
led some writers to look for similarities between some principles of
international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict situations—such
as the prohibition on starvation of civilians or the free passage of essential
food and medicine—to the economic sanctions situation.39 While the
commentators generally reject the argument that sought to include nonmilitary interventions (e.g., unilateral economic sanctions) within the scope

34

See Antonios Tzanakopoulos, State Responsibility For “Targeted Sanctions,” 113 AM. J. INT’L L.
UNBOUND, 135, 138 (2019).
35
Military and Paramilitary Activates in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 276 (June 27).
36
Information and Case Studies, supra note 20, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). See also Maastricht Principles
on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ETO
CONSORTIUM (Jan. 2013), https://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastrichtprinciples/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23 [hereinafter Maastricht Principles].
37
Idriss Jazairy, Unilateral Economic Sanctions, International Law, and Human Rights, 33
CARNEGIE COUNCIL FOR ETHICS IN INT’L AFFS. 291, 291 (2019).
38
See, e.g., Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28.
39
Hans-Peter Gasser, Collective Economic Sanctions and International Humanitarian Law—An
Enforcement Measure Under the United Nations Charter and the Right of Civilians to Immunity: An
Unavoidable Clash of Policy Goals?, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND
VÖLKERRECHT [ZAORV] 871, 901 (1996).
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of the UN Charter Article 2(4) prohibiting the use of force,40 international
human rights laws and literature are, to some extent, sensitive to discussions
regarding the similarities between the effects of economic sanctions and war
on civilian populations. When discussing the obligations unaffected by
countermeasures, the UN International Law Commission refers to the
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of
victims of international armed conflicts to draw an analogy with the
prohibition, contained therein, of using the “starvation of civilians as a
method of warfare.”41 The Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on
the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of
Human Rights concludes in its report in 2018 that “the combination of
comprehensive unilateral coercive measures and the imposition of secondary
sanctions on third parties unrelated to the dispute are tantamount to a
peacetime blockade.”42
A major step toward human rights limitations on economic sanctions
was at the urging of the UN Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“CESR”) to states to refrain from enacting food embargoes and
measures that directly restrict or endanger the production and supply of
food43 and adequate medicine and medical equipment.44 The CESCR’s
provision made states imposing sanctions responsible for the direct
consequences of their food and medicine embargoes, a weapon which some
claim is still used in modern warfare.45 While the CESCR believes that the
imposition of economic sanctions does not nullify and diminish the
obligation of the sanctioned state to protect the human rights of its citizens,46

40

J. Curtis Henderson, Legality of Economic Sanctions Under International Law: The Case of
Nicaragua, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 180 (1986).
41
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 54, ¶ 1, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; Int’l L. Comm’n Rep., supra note 10.
42
U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral
Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, ¶ 34, A/HRC/39/54 (2018).
43
General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 37.
44
U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶ 41, E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 14].
45
JOANNA MACRAE & ANTHONY B. ZWIWI, Food as an Instrument of War in Contemporary African
Famines: A Review of the Evidence, in 16 DISASTERS 299, 299 (1992). See e.g., Garfield, Devin, & Fausey,
supra note 28, at 454.
46
U.N. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8 on the Work of Its
Seventeenth Session, E/C.12/1997/8, at ¶ 10 (1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 8] (“While sanctions
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it calls on the sanctioning state to distinguish between the basic objectives of
its sanctions and “the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most
vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”47
A major step in developing the role of human rights in the adoption
and implementation of economic countermeasures and sanctions was the
creation of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States,48 which aimed at
codifying and developing customary international law on state responsibility,
means of reparation49 and the adoption of countermeasures as an instrument
of response by the injured state. Article 50(1)(b) provides that regardless of
how grave a state’s wrongful act may be and no matter how critical its
failure to respect international obligations any countermeasure introduced
shall not affect the “obligations for protection of fundamental human
rights.”50 This obligation is addressed to either the sanctioning state51 or the
sanctioned state52 and imposes certain limits on economic sanctions.53
Article 50(1)(b)’s strong language54 develops a legal framework for the
sanctioning state, where the adoption of countermeasures cannot impinge on
the “protection of fundamental human rights.” The question, then, will be
whether the sanctioning state’s obligation with regards to its sanction
measures is only a negative obligation to refrain from imposing de jure
prohibitions on the trade of humanitarian goods or whether this obligation
goes further, such that a state could be held liable for the extraterritorial
effects of its unilateral measures.

will inevitably diminish the capacity of the affected State to fund or support some of the necessary
measures, the State remains under an obligation to ensure the absence of discrimination in relation to the
enjoyment of these rights, and to take all possible measures, including negotiations with other States and
the international community, to reduce to a minimum the negative impact upon the rights of vulnerable
groups within the society.”).
47
Id. ¶ 4.
48
See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 10, at 132 cmt. 6–7.
49
Id. at 129–37 (means of reparation include restitution, compensation, and satisfaction).
50
Id. at 131.
51
See Silvia Borelli & Simon Olleson, Obligations Relating to Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1187–88 (James Crawfordet al. eds., 2010).
52
HANS MORTEN HAUGEN, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: WITH A PARTICULAR
EMPHASIS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' MEASURES FOR FOOD PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION 365 (2007).
53
See Int’l Law Comm’n Rep., supra note 10, at 131.
54
Id.
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IV.

PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FOOD AND HEALTH

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”) defines the right to adequate food as a “right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living.”55 This definition refers to physical56 and
economic57 access to adequate food.58 Similarly, the ICESCR calls on state
parties to recognize the universal right to physical and mental health,59
which closely relates to the right to life.60 This requires that facilities and
goods be available, accessible, acceptable and be of good quality.61
Despite the general definition of these two rights, the ICESCR put
forward a minimalistic understanding of the core content of these rights. The
states’ obligation to comply with the core content of these rights is an
immediate rather than progressive obligation.62 Accordingly, the ICESCR
recognizes the fundamental aspect and core obligation of the right to food by
“recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”63
Equally, access to life-saving medicines is viewed as a core content, with a
minimum level of right to health.64 The CESCR calls on states to “refrain at
all times from imposing embargoes or similar measures restricting the
supply of another state with adequate medicines and medical equipment.”65

55

G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at art.
11 ¶ 1 (Jan. 3, 1976).
56
General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 8 (“availability of food in a quantity and quality
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals”).
57
Id. ¶ 13 (“Financial costs associated with the acquisition of food for an adequate diet” which do
not threaten “the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs . . . .”).
58
Rome Declaration, supra note 21, ¶ 13.
59
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 55, art. 12; see G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, art. 25(1) (Dec. 10, 1948); see also G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, at art. 24 (Nov. 20, 1989).
60
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (Dec. 16,
1966) (relating to right to life through increase and/or decrease in infant mortality and life expectancy); see
also U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5 (Apr. 30, 1982)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 6].
61
General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 12(d) (“As well as being culturally acceptable, health
facilities, goods and services must also be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality. This
requires, inter alia, skilled medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital
equipment, safe and potable water, and adequate sanitation.”).
62
General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 1 (For right to food: CESAR links the identification of
the medicines to the WHO Model List of Essential Drugs (G.C. 14, ¶ 12(a)).
63
General Comment No. 6, supra note 60, art. 11(2).
64
General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 43(d).
65
General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 41.
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In addition, the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligation on Social
and Economic Rights insist on humanitarian goods and require states to fully
respect human rights obligations in the “the design, implementation and
termination of any sanctions regime,” and to refrain from embargoes on
“goods and services essential to meet core obligations.”66
Recent sanctions programs generally include food and medicinerelated carve-outs to comply with states’ obligations contained in the human
rights treaties and the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States. Although
these humanitarian exemptions have become a universal clause, controversy
nevertheless exists regarding the effectiveness of these textual exemptions
and carve-outs in protecting the fundamental rights of the target
population.67
The CESCR sets a clear distinction between three levels of human
rights obligations with which states must comply. These are known as “the
obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfill.”68 The obligation to respect is
a negative obligation on states to ensure that they do not adopt measures or
take actions which violate human rights. The obligation to protect lies
between the obligation to respect and obligation to fulfill. It goes beyond a
mere negative obligation of the state by calling upon the states to ensure that
the human rights in question are not significantly affected by measures
taken.69 Finally, the obligation to fulfill requires the state to proactively take
actions that improve living conditions, like individuals’ access to food and
medicine (obligation to facilitate). If the state is unsuccessful in this, they

66

Maastricht Principles, supra note 36, ¶ 22.
Some sanction programs also view humanitarian exemptions from a business perspective. For
example in Canada’s Special Economic Measures Act (“SEMA”) 2010 against Iran, Canada expressed its
business expectation such that despite “areas of trade that are expressly permitted under the Regulations—
such as trade in wheat, pulses and vaccines, of which Canada is historically a large supplier—which fall
under the exemption for the provision of food and medicines” these areas will be affected by sanctions “if
Iran decides to retaliate for the additional measures imposed by choosing alternative suppliers for these
goods.” Special Economic Measures (Iran) Regulations, SOR/2010-165 (Can.).
68
General Comment No. 12, supra note 19, ¶ 15.
69
General Comment No. 14, supra note 44, ¶ 35 (“Obligations to protect include, inter alia, the
duties of States to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care and
health-related services provided by third parties; to ensure that privatization of the health sector does not
constitute a threat to the availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, goods and
services; to control the marketing of medical equipment and medicines by third parties; and to ensure that
medical practitioners and other health professionals meet appropriate standards of education, skill and
ethical codes of conduct.”).
67
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must provide assistance and aid directly to the individuals (obligation to
provide).70
There is a serious doubt concerning whether providing a textual carveout for humanitarian goods in a sanction programs releases the sanctioning
state from its obligation to protect fundamental human rights. The obligation
to protect requires that a state refrains from taking actions that directly
affects fundamental human rights. However, the obligation goes further than
this simple textual carve-out by obligating a state to ensure that impediments
and obstacles to trade of humanitarian goods are effectively removed. The
question is therefore how to interpret the scope of a sanctioning state’s
obligation to remove impediments to the provision of human rights-related
goods from its sanction regulation, in light of the state’s liability for the
extraterritorial effects of its domestic measures.
A.

Impact on the Target Population

Generally, a state can be held liable for actions occurring outside its
territory and jurisdiction only under exceptional circumstances such as
situations when a state exercises control over a territory or when a state
exercises authority and control over an individual.71
The impact of a domestic action outside of the jurisdiction of a state
can also trigger liability issues for the acting state. If a state’s domestic
action leads to a violation of human rights outside of its jurisdiction, a state
can be held liable.72 Sanction programs are not static, and their impact is not
necessarily limited to the territory of the sanctioning state. Sanctioning states
often resort to a variety of components to maximize the effectiveness of
sanctions. This increases the pressure on the target state. As such, each
sanction program might have a different humanitarian impact on the target
population. These components consist in the nature of the sanction
measures, the reach of these measures, the number of states adopting the
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sanction measures and the dominant and exclusive control of the sanctioning
state on the target’s transactional supply chain and economy.
1.

Comprehensiveness

A major motivating factor for a sanctioning state increasing the power
and impact of sanction programs relates to the scope of sanctions. The
decision to increase the scope of sanctions and to extend the areas of
prohibition to different sectors of the sanctioned state’s economy not directly
related to the state’s wrongful act increases pressure on the civilian
population in the sanctioned state.
The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the broad and
comprehensive embargoes imposed by the UNSC in the 1990s on Iraq73 led
to a major shift in the UNSC policy toward using economic sanctions. This
shift forced the United Nations to step back from the traditional policy of
designing comprehensive sanctions and adopt a smarter approach. Instead of
sanctioning the target state’s whole economy, the UNSC has moved to
sanctioning certain sectors and individuals directly related to the target
state’s wrongful act.74 However, while comprehensive sanctions are no
longer considered a multilateral solution to threats to peace and security,
they are still used in the state-to-state unilateral context.75 The underlying
reason for using comprehensive sanctions is that it pushes the ruling elites of
the affected population to seek a change in the policies of their state to end
the suffering of the sanctioned population.76
Comprehensive sanctions have regressive effects on the right to health
and food since the burden falls on the most vulnerable parts of the
population.77 The decision-makers in the sanctioned state, who should really
be the targets of these sanctions, may find the latter desirable and
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advantageous on a personal level.78 Comprehensive sanctions harm the
sanctioned state’s economy in a significant manner by crippling sensitive
income-generating sectors of the economy, especially in mono-product
countries.79 Far-reaching comprehensive sanctions, in addition to negative
macroeconomic consequences, usually lead to a chilling effect discouraging
foreign business entities from engaging in authorized transactions, to avoid
any unintentional violation of sanction measures.80 In addition, sanctions
increase transaction costs by making public goods unavailable in the
sanctioned state, causing a catastrophic situation in both economic and social
terms.
According to the CESCR, comprehensive sanctions cause “significant
disruption in the distribution of food, pharmaceuticals and sanitation
supplies, jeopardize the quality of food and the availability of clean drinking
water, severely interfere with the functioning of basic health and education
systems, and undermine the right to work.”81 Considering the above
elements, the more comprehensive the sanction program is, the more
powerful the impact of the restrictive measures and the more likely it is that
they harm average citizens.82
2.

Extraterritoriality

The other element strengthening the impact of sanction programs is
the extraterritorial application of domestic sanction measures. The element
of extraterritoriality in sanction programs, often known as secondary
sanctions, aims at universalizing the restrictive measures by closing other
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trade alternatives for the target state, thereby increasing the reach of the
sanctions.
An extraterritorial sanction program sets certain restrictions on
individuals and entities outside of the jurisdiction of the sanctioning state,
who generally conduct business with the target state.83 Such programs assert
that accessing the sanctioning state’s market should be penalized and
punished as a breach of the domestic sanction provisions. This “jurisdiction
by territorial extension of domestic law”84 has been highly controversial in
international relations.85 It ignores the conventional understanding of
jurisdiction toward other states causing the opposing states to react to these
measures by enacting blocking statutes.86
On the other side, the extraterritorial sanctions have been questioned
as being unlawful with regards to its human rights impact toward target
state.87 By generalizing the restriction to all commercial partners around the
globe, extraterritorial sanctions remove any alternative ways for the
sanctioned state to continue its foreign trade and reduces the bargaining
power of the sanctioned state in doing trade, even trade of humanitarian
goods.88
3.

Multilateralization

One element that increases the power of sanction measures is the
number of states adopting the same restrictive measure against the target
country. Creating an effective coalition for the implementation of restrictive
measures makes sanctions more likely to succeed and affects the financial
and trading capacity of the target country. Sanctioning states have sought to
design measures and actions ensuring “that sanctions measures are applied
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multilaterally whenever possible.”89 However, this requires a continuous
effort from sanctioning states to expand the reach of the restrictive measures
by maintaining an alliance with all participants despite different objectives.
Therefore, working with like-minded countries to grow the list of
sanctioning states, with the aim of maximizing the impact of the sanction
provisions, has been at the cornerstone of sanctioning states’ foreign policy.
The comparison between the economic sanctions imposed against Iran
in the 2010–2013 period, and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of secondary sanctions against Iran in May 2018, illustrates the
importance of the multilateralization element to increase the power and
impact of sanction programs. Multilateralism in sanction programs is
generally ensured through the initiation or backing of the program by the
UNSC. In July 2010, the European Union and the United States enacted two
sanction regulations that set considerable prohibitions on Iran’s energy and
financial sectors.90 These restrictions, introduced after the imposition of
UNSC Resolution 1929 against Iran, had a significant impact on Iran’s
economy and its foreign trade sector due to the adoption of similar
prohibitive measures by Iran’s major trading partners, such as Switzerland,
Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan.91 The restrictions significantly
impacted Iran’s economy.
The multilateralization effort, even in the absence of a UNSC specific
ruling on the prohibitive measure, can have a serious impact on the
sanctioned state. The EU Council Decision dated January 23, 2012,92 which
banned the purchase of Iranian crude oil, was adopted following discussions
among high-level political decision-makers in Europe. It was the outcome of
a multilateral effort initiated by the United States, which had enacted the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (“NDAA 2012”).93
This set of sanction provisions, though going significantly further than the
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legal prohibitions provided under the UNSC resolutions against Iran,94 was
orchestrated by a coalition of like-minded countries with a multilaterally
agreed target.95
4.

Monopoly Situation

A business transaction requires availability of certain logistical
elements—such as banking relations, insurance, and means of
transportation—without which a transaction could not be completed. Unlike
extraterritorial sanctions, which directly address elements outside of the
jurisdiction of the sanctioning state, holding a monopoly over one of the
constituent elements of a business transaction enables the sanctioning state
to give extraterritorial effect to its domestic measure, vis-à-vis individuals
and entities outside of its territory.
The U.S. banking system is a perfect example of such a monopoly. Its
monopoly over banking payments, insurance, and transportation means U.S.
domestic sanctions indirectly prevent individuals and entities, who are
subject to a different jurisdiction, from providing domestically-prohibited
services to the sanctioned state.96 In such a context, the United States enjoys
a monopoly over one of the key components of the trading chain, thus
impeding the formation of the business transactions, which should have been
outside the scope of the U.S. jurisdiction, and making economic sanctions
one of the utmost effective tools for dictating a desired foreign policy.
a.

The International Financial System: the U.S. Example

The most important chain in a transaction, the monopoly for which is
currently held by the United States, is the banking system. The banking
system facilitates the transfer of the value of a transaction from one party to
another. In the absence of such a crucial component, the transaction will not
be completed. U.S. leverage over the international banking system comes

94
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from the dominance of the U.S. currency, which started as the reserve
currency for most countries following the internationalization process of the
U.S. Dollar.97 It also acts as the trade settlement currency due to the fact that
it acts as a benchmark for commodity prices, such as oil, in global markets.98
This makes the U.S. Dollar the usual currency for international transactions,
foreign exchange reserves of central banks around the world and forex
trading.99 The United States has used its banking leverage and the
international financial mechanism as a powerful tool for limiting access to
financial institutions breaching U.S. secondary sanctions through their
conduct of “significant financial transactions”100 on behalf of sanctioned
nationals and individuals, to the international banking system.101 The
intertwining of the United States and global financial systems102 allows for
the possibility of prohibiting certain entities and their banks from opening
correspondent or payable-through accounts in the United States. Further
actions, like restricting access to financial messaging services such as
SWIFT,103 act as powerful instruments in the hands of the United States to
punish foreign financial institutions that fail to comply with U.S. sanctions.
Such actions, which take place either through judicial indictment, U.S.
Treasury designation, or fines addressed to the major banks for their past
actions facilitating transactions for a sanctioned state,104 can cause the
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depletion of a bank’s deposits and even the permanent closure of the bank.105
This forces the sanctioned state to make a considerable shift in its trade
policy, at least on the short term.106
Besides financial institutions, such restrictive measures can also target
a banking jurisdiction in its entirety by sanctioning the use of the sanctioned
state’s currency by other financial institutions.107 Designating the sanctioned
state’s banking sector as an area at risk for money laundering is a further
action that can be taken by sanctioning states. For example, the U.S.
President’s decision in November 2011 designated Iran as an area of
“primary money laundering concern”108 and authorized the United States to
take special measures against foreign banks establishing corresponding
relations with Iranian financial institutions. Such a domestic measure has
had a significant impact on Iran’s banking sector, to the extent that even
when U.S. secondary sanctions against Iran were lifted following the
implementation of the Iran nuclear deal, Iran’s banking relations
nevertheless failed to normalize with non-Iranian financial institutions.
By using its dominant position in global financial markets, the United
States’ actions went further than sanctioning international financial
institutions and have been used as a powerful instrument to persuade
international companies to walk away from doing business with the

Mitsubishi UFJ was fined $250 Million in June 2013. See Oriana Roncarolo, Arms and Dual-Use Goods
Export
Controls,
DELOITTE
(Nov.
23,
2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/it/Documents/finance/dualusegoods/Opening%20Address
_O.%20Roncarolo.pdf.
105
Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea,
REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2013, 7:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swissbank-wegelinidUSBRE9020O020130104 (explaining that U.S. indictment against the Switzerland’s oldest bank, Bank
Wegelin & Co., caused the bank to close permanently).
106
See Carrie Lyn Donigan Guymon, The Best Tool for the Job: The US Campaign to Freeze Assets
of Proliferators and Their Supporters, 49 VA. J. INT’L 849, 877 (2009) (providing the example that the U.S.
Treasury’s designation of Banco Delta Asia SARL as a “primary money laundering concern” on September
2005, led to depletion of 34% of deposits from this bank and acted as a major element in causing North
Korea to seriously re-engage in the Six Party Talks).
107
Exec. Order 13,645, 78 C.F.R. 33945 (June 3, 2013) (for example, US sanctions against the
Iranian currency (the Rial) under U.S. President Executive Order 13,645, June 3, 2013).
108
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (under section
311 of the U.S. Patriot Act authorizing the United States to adopt special measures against a jurisdiction as
a whole, an institution, a class of transactions or a type of account).

322

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 2

sanctioned state.109 In one of the most prominent cases, the French
multinational oil company, Total, announced that following the U.S.
withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the reinstatement of U.S.
secondary sanctions, it was not in a position to continue operating the megaproject, South Pars 11, in Iran due to several U.S.-created risks,110 including
the risk of “loss of financing in dollars by U.S. banks for [its] worldwide
operations.” Indeed, U.S. banks were involved in more than ninety percent
of Total’s financing operations.111
The pressure and reputational risk for commercial partners working
with a sanctioned state, including non-sanctioned areas, and the possibility
of unknowingly breaching sanction provisions—exposing commercial
partners to administrative and judicial enforcement actions in the United
States—dissuades commercial partners from engaging in business
transactions, whether or not they are permitted, due to the potential
triggering of default events and acceleration clauses with their commercial
counterparties.112
b.

The Insurance Industry: the EU Example

Another major chain in transactions, necessary for completing any
trading operation and modes of transportation of goods, is insurance.
Insurance coverage, either for the cargo, the vessel or the ports, is required
for a seller to ship goods to the buyer. Without insurance, a commercial
transaction will not be completed. The European insurance industry provides
most of the insurance coverage for the world’s maritime transportation. To
some extent, the European Union and, in particular, the United Kingdom,

109
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enjoy the same leverage over the insurance industry as the United States has
over the international banking system.
This level of influence exerted by the European Union allowed their
domestic measures to enjoy a significant extraterritorial effect, going so far
as to affect the trade of foodstuffs and medicine.113 The EU ban on the
(re)insurance of tankers carrying Iranian crude oil was an effective measure
on the Iranian economy.114 European protection and indemnity insurers
(“P&Is”)115 were unable to provide related services, thus leaving Iranian
vessels without insurance coverage.116
Restrictive measures on insurance and transportation not only
significantly increase the cost of transactions,117 they also cause considerable
delays (up to four times more than usual) in the importation of goods into
the sanctioned state, assuming the commercial operators are able to complete
their transactions at all.118
5.

The Economy of the Sanctioned State: Macroeconomic Consequences

Another element affecting the efficacy of sanction programs concerns
the sanctioned state’s macroeconomic structure and its degree of economic
interdependence. The fact that the sanctioned state depends on outside
sources for financial aid or food is key in assessing the humanitarian impact
of economic sanctions. For example, the U.S. decision to deny credit
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facilities to Poland that would have allowed it to buy U.S. corn had a
considerable short-term impact on the Polish civilian population, due to
Poland’s dependence on this external source for food.119
The most devastating effects of sanctions stem from the
macroeconomic consequences of economic sanctions on the target country.
The impacts depend on the structure and the level of resilience of each
economy. Macroeconomic repercussions of sanctions generally include high
inflation, lowered purchasing power, and a reduction in access to essential
goods.120 High inflation and the unavailability of external finance following
the imposition of sanctions caused Sudan’s annual gross domestic product to
decline.121 Malnourishment among children increased from five percent to
twenty-three percent in Haiti following sanctions.122 The decline in
economic activities,123 the inefficient allocation and utilization of resources,
the unequal distribution of facilities and budget cuts in the health sector,124
result in the spread of diseases, some of which become untreatable due to
lack of access to clean water, sufficient food, and life-saving medicine.125 As
an example, economic sanctions against Burma caused thousands of layoffs,
including 100,000 women working in the textile industry and forced many
unemployed women to engage in prostitution.126
The role of foreign trade in the economy of a sanctioned state and the
diversity of its income-generating exports of goods and services also play a
major role in the level of impact sanctions will have. Targeting incomegenerating sectors of an economy limits the financial capacity of a
sanctioned state to continue its routine trade. This limitation, if it hits mono-
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product economies, becomes particularly potent. Countries whose
economies are almost exclusively based on the exportation of a limited
number of commodities are the most vulnerable to sanctions. The economic
sanctions against Iran were crippling once they began targeting the purchase
of Iranian crude oil and oil products.
The National Defense Authorization Act (“NDAA”), enacted in 2012
and entered into force on January 23, 2012 by EU Council Decision,127
prohibited the “import, purchase or transport of Iranian crude oil and
petroleum products”128 and the “financing or financial assistance, including
financial derivatives, as well as insurance and reinsurance” related to these
activities.129 This led to a sharp drop in Iranian crude oil exports, as much as
a third of usual exports.130 This amounted to a loss of $133 million per day
and an annual loss of $48 billion, or approximately ten percent of the Iranian
economy.131 The European Union’s decision to designate the Central Bank of
Iran (“CBI”) as a sanctioned entity alongside identical U.S. measures,132 led
to an international freeze at several financial institutions on the funds and
assets of the CBI, which act as the main recipient of the proceeds of the sale
of Iranian crude oil.133 The sanction measure against CBI, which also acts as
financial facilitator for the trade of food and medicine in Iran,134 had a
significant impact on the CBI’s operations and Iranians’ access to essential
medicines.135
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Other Elements

The gravity of the wrongful act being sanctioned confers greater
legitimacy on such economic countermeasures. The impact of the sanctions
on the affected population are also determined by further, “softer” elements.
Such elements include the influence of specific pressure groups altering the
effectiveness of economic sanctions in their early phases;136 the legal
enforcement actions available within a sanction program, like the possibility
of punishing any engagement, whether pursued knowingly or unknowingly
by an entity, with sanctioned entities or activities;137 the level of judicial
review available for sanction-related decisions and regulations;138 the use of
more or less ambiguous legal terminology without any clear definitions or
guidelines; and the provision of broad definitions increasing the scope of
sanctions.139
Finally, the manner in which the sanction is enforced and the
seriousness of the application of legal measures play an important role in the
severity of the sanctions.140 The sudden or gradual enforcement actions
leading to a sanction,141 the aggressive approach of the sanctioning state,142

136

For example, in the United States, the “Cuban lobby” with regards to sanctions against Cuba; the
“Jewish lobby” with respect to sanctions on Libya, Iraq, and Iran; the “Armenian lobby” with respect to
Azerbaijan; etc. See Thomas Ambrosio, Legitimate Influence or Parochial Capture? Conclusions on Ethnic
Identity Groups and the Formulation of U.S. Foreign Policy, in ETHNIC IDENTITY GROUPS AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY 206 (Thomas Ambrosio ed., 2002).
137
Guymon, supra note 106, at 856 (noting that a person is subject to designation for engaging in
activities that “pose a risk” of materially contributing to proliferation as opposed to making any actual
contribution).
138
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018) (designating the statutory standard of review limits the courts’
determination to whether a decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152, 158 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding the court is not permitted “to make any judgment whatsoever regarding whether the
material before the Secretary is or is not true,” but is allowed to inquire “whether the Secretary had enough
information before [him] to come to the conclusion”) (internal quotations omitted); Paradissiotis v. Rubin,
171 F.3d 983, 987 (5th Cir. 1999).
139
See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 8701 (2018) (incorporating the definition of “United States person” from 22
U.S.C. § 8511 (2018) and lowering the EAR de minimis threshold for sanctioned countries, such Cuba and
Iran, from 25% to 10% U.S.-origin content, thus changing the definition of U.S. goods, for which U.S.
control laws apply extraterritorially); see also Restricting Additional Exports and Reexports to Cuba, 84
Fed. Reg. 56,117 (Oct. 21, 2019) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, and 746),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/21/2019-22876/restricting-additional-exports-andreexports-to-cuba.
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the employment of non-legal measures, such as political and media pressure,
and the way sanctions are portrayed in domestic politics of the target
country143 also affect the efficacy of economic sanctions.
B.

The Human Rights Obligations of the Sanctioning State

Sanctions are aimed at reducing trade flows, denying investment, and
limiting foreign exchange and credit facilities to the country. Therefore,
sanctions affect access to humanitarian goods because they have a negative
impact on the macroeconomic indexes of the target economy, dropping the
value of the sanctioned state’s currency, depleting the state’s foreign
exchange reserves, causing liquidity shortages due to the inconvertibility or
non-transferability of its income, and limiting access to funds needed for
purchasing humanitarian goods.144 The negative macroeconomic impact
along with the traders’ unwillingness to engage in trade with the sanctioned
state due to reputational damage and difficulties in securing a method of
payment and obtaining letters of credit, even for humanitarian goods,145
makes ring-fencing the trade of humanitarian goods from the general impact
of sanction programs impossible.
The sanctioning state’s efforts to convince other states to adopt similar
restrictive measures against the sanctioned state and a state’s monopoly in at
least one of the components necessary for the formation of business
transactions push foreign companies to refrain from permissible business of
the target country. In addition, existence of factors such as the ambivalence
of the sanction regulations, and political and media pressure can exacerbate
the level of caution the international companies adopt in dealing with a
sanctioned country. Restricted access to banking services and difficulties in

142
For example, the U.S. announced in 2018 that it had adopted a maximum pressure policy and that
harming Iran was the “actual[] intended consequence[]” of the sanctions regime. Background Briefing on
President Trump's Decision to Withdraw From the JCPOA, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. (May 8, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/background-briefing-on-president-trumps-decision-to-withdraw-from-the-jcpoa/.
143
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, supra note 16, ¶ 7.
144
For example, following U.S. sanctions against Iran on oil sales, billions of dollars of payments for
the purchase of Iranian oil were held up in South Korea and India due to the countries’ inability to complete
funds transfers to Iran. See Cho Mee-young & Yoo Choonsik, Exclusive: Sanctions Trap Billions of Iran
Pertrodollars in Korea, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011, 3:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-irankorea/exclusive-sanctions-trap-billions-of-iran-petrodollars-in-korea-idUSTRE77228Q20110803.
145
See Nigel Hunt & Michael Hogan, Exclusive: EU Banks Halt Iran Grain Trade Finance, REUTERS
(Jan. 26, 2012, 10:05 PM), https://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/2012/Jan-26/161189-eubanks-halt-iran-grain-trade-finance-traders.ashx.

328

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 2

securing insurance policies increase the associated risks and the cost of
transactions. This consequently decreases overall trade volumes. As such,
the general impact of sanctions on the whole economy makes it impossible
to isolate the effects of comprehensive economic countermeasures on the
access to food and medicine,146 leading to a generalized shortage of essential
medicine and medical equipment.147
1.

Human Rights Impact Assessment

The increase in the impact of sanction programs causes a higher level
of care and duty for the sanctioning state to limit negative effects and to
ensure that fundamental human rights, such as access to food and medicine,
are protected. In this respect, the CESCR sets out obligations for states and
organizations “responsible for the imposition, maintenance or
implementation of the sanctions,” to fully take into account the social and
economic rights provided for in the ICESCR when designing sanction
programs. The Committee is of the view that the key provisions of the UN
Charter dealing with human rights (Articles 1, 55, and 56) fully apply when
imposing sanctions:148 “whatever the circumstances, such sanctions should
always take full account of the provisions of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”149
The Human Rights Council presents a more structured approach to
this obligation by stating that an effective “human rights impact
assessment,”150 with the purpose of identifying, examining, and measuring
the effects of sanctions on human rights “should become a non-derogable
standard in cases of sanctions imposed by groups of States or regional
organizations.”151 This impact assessment, which can be conducted not only
by the sanctioning states, but also by NGOs and international
organizations,152 should be conducted ex ante before sanction regimes are
applied, with the “aim to measure the potential future effects of such

146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Garfield, Devin, & Fausey, supra note 28, at 465.
See, e.g., id. at 458.
General Comment No. 8, supra note 46, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 1.
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measures on human rights” and possibly “adjust or change the sanctions
regime with a view to preventing human rights violations.”153
2.

Monitoring and Responding to Suffering

The humanitarian impact assessment of sanction measures should not
be limited to the phase when sanctions are designed and introduced. The
Council proposes that the impact assessment continue ex post by measuring
“the actual impact of implemented sanctions through comparisons between
the current situation and the situation before the measures were adopted.”154
The ex post assessment shall include the materialized human rights risks,
unforeseen effects, affected stakeholders, and the mitigating measures that
could be adopted to reduce negative effects.155
The CESCR also highlights proposals such as establishing “a United
Nations mechanism for anticipating and tracking sanctions impacts” and
“[creating] a better resourced set of sanctions committees”156 to better
monitor the humanitarian impact of economic sanctions on the civilian
population of the sanctioned state. After monitoring for negative effects, the
sanctioning state would be required “to respond to any disproportionate
suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country.”157
V.

IRAN SANCTIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ICJ’S RULING

On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the
Iran 5+1 nuclear deal (the “JCPOA”) by issuing a National Security
Presidential Memorandum (“NSPM”). Following the implementation of the
JCPOA, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 on July 20,
2015, the UN, U.S., and EU sanctions against Iran, which were targeting
almost the entire economy of Iran, were lifted. The significance of Iran’s
nuclear activities to Western countries and Iran’s resistance to their sanctions
mobilized the entire economic and political clout of the sanctioning states,

153

Id. at 296–97.
Id. at 297.
155
See Human Rights Impact Assessments: A Review of the Literature, Differences with Other Forms
of Assessments and Relevance for Development, NORDIC TR. FUND & THE WORLD BANK 30 (Feb. 2013),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/834611524474505865/pdf/125557-WP-PUBLIC-HRIAWeb.pdf.
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who ended up enacting what some view158 as some of the most punitive
economic sanctions ever, with some of the most complex and severe sets of
restrictive measures adopted by U.S. Department of Treasury.159
The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA led to the reinstatement of U.S.
sanctions against Iran, including the U.S. Presidential Executive Orders and
the main congressional acts, such as the Iran Sanctions Act, the Iran Threat
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act, the National Defense Authorization
Act, and the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act.160 Accordingly, the
United States’ comprehensive and secondary sanctions were unilaterally
imposed. Two ninety- and one-hundred-eighty-day wind-down periods were
considered for non-U.S. companies to terminate their activities and exit
Iran.161 The sudden decrease, by seventy percent, of the value of the Iranian
currency162 following the imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iran in May
2018, and the end of banking relations between Iranian and non-Iranian
banks163 affected the importation and prices of imported medicines and
goods used for the production of medicines in Iran.

158

Patrick Goodenough, Obama Touts Toughest Iran Sanctions in History, But Report Questions
Their Effectiveness, CNSNEWS (Oct. 23, 2012, 4:35 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-toutstoughest-iran-sanctions-history-report-questions-their-effectiveness; Biden Touts Iran Sanctions as Ryan
Voices Doubts, YAHOO! NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/biden-touts-iran-sanctions-ryanvoices-doubts-013524142--election.html.
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161
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2018 National Security Presidential Memorandum Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY 1 (May 8, 2018), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/jcpoa_winddown_faqs.pdf.
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Mohammad Nasiri, Iranians Say US Sanctions Blocking Access to Needed Medicine, A.P. NEWS
(July 30, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/23327f44786845dbbecee530664ee5a6.
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See Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, Ambiguity in Trump Sanctions Could Put Humanitarian Trade with
Iran
at
Risk,
BOURSE
&
BAZAAR
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14,
2018),
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2018/5/10/deadly-ambiguity-in-trump-sanctions-move-risks-allhumanitarian-trade-with-iran (“Interruptions in banking channels saw payments turn from the use of
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The re-imposition of U.S. comprehensive secondary sanctions on Iran
and the humanitarian impact of these measures led Iran to initiate judicial
proceedings before the International Court of Justice against the United
States on July 18, 2018, based on the violation of the 1955 Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights.164 Iran further submitted a
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures.165 In its Request, Iran
asked the court to order that the United States “immediately take all
measures at its disposal to ensure the suspension of the implementation and
enforcement of all of the sanctions from May 8, including the extraterritorial
sanctions.”166
The United States argued that the U.S. sanctions targeting the Iranian
economy provided for broad authorizations and exceptions167 “for
conducting or facilitating a transaction for the provision (including any sale)
of agricultural commodities, food, medicine or medical devices to Iran.”168
However, Iran claimed that despite these carve-outs and exemptions, the
applicable measures made the importation of urgently needed supplies
impossible and “deeply affected the delivery and availability” of life-saving
medicines and medical equipment to the Iranian people.169
Iran, in its claim arguing for the detrimental impact of U.S. sanctions
on Iranian civilians, referred to certain elements in the U.S. sanctions that
could amplify their impact. Iran referred to statements made by U.S.
authorities expressing their “[determination] to cause even greater
prejudice”170 against Iran, tighten the screws on Iran,171 and about the U.S.
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Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 2018 I.C.J. 175 (July 16).
165
Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 77 (explaining the request for provisional measures
was submitted pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute and to Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the Rules of
International Court of Justice. The Court’s power to indicate provisional measures exist when there is a risk
that irreparable prejudice could be caused to rights which are the subject of judicial proceedings, or when
the alleged disregard of such rights may entail irreparable consequences and if there is urgency, in the sense
that there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused before the Court gives its
final decision).
166
Id. ¶ 14.
167
Clarifying Guidance on Humanitarial Assistance and Related Exports to the Iranian People,
TREASURY DEP’T OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/hum_exp_iran.pdf.
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administration’s maximum pressure policy and the announcement of further
sanctions and their chilling effects.172 These were important facts in
establishing a real and imminent risk that would cause irreparable prejudice.
This matter highlights the importance of the sanctioning state’s approach
when increasing the impact of its sanctions.173 Additionally, Iran referred to
the extraterritorial element to show how the impact of U.S. sanctions
exacerbated their chilling effect on many foreign companies and nationals,
who announced “their withdrawal from activities in Iran, including the
termination of their contractual relations with Iranian companies and
nationals.”174
On October 3, 2018, the ICJ issued an interim order establishing an
important step in the role of human rights obligations when designing and
imposing economic sanctions.175 Although the court order was instituted
mainly in accordance with the 1955 Treaty of Amity, it marks a new
development with regard to the duty of the sanctioning state vis-à-vis the
fundamental human rights of the sanctioned state’s civilian population.
A.

Importance of the Impact

The ICJ first reminded the parties of the importance of human rights
obligations. The “importation and purchase of goods required for
humanitarian needs” was discussed as a necessary element that cannot be
superseded, even by measures “necessary to protect . . . essential security
interests” of the sanctioning states.176 Further, the court, instead of reviewing
the domestic sanction measure of the sanctioning state, focused on the
impact of the sanction measures and deemed that a sanctioning state’s mere
textual exemption and expression of best endeavor is insufficient for
claiming fulfillment of its duty of care. These elements “are not adequate to
address fully the humanitarian and safety concerns raised by the
Applicant.”177
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The court’s findings regarding the existence of an “Imminent Risk,”
“Irreparable Impact,”178 and “Irreparable Prejudice,” to assess whether the
requirements for an interim order were satisfied, went a step further from
focusing only on the domestic sanctions measure. The court considered the
“irreparable consequences” the sanctions may have on the population of the
sanctioned state, without being merely satisfied with “rights relating to the
importation and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs.”179 In
addition, the court noted the restrictions on companies providing
maintenance for Iranian aviation companies.180 This provided an insight that
the court may also take into account how the sanction measure spells out in
practice.
The United States’ claim that “there could be multiple causes to which
the economic stagnation and difficulties in Iran can be attributed, including
mismanagement by the Iranian Government” was ruled out by the court on
the basis that it is difficult “to assess the specific impact of its measures on
the Iranian economy.”181 In return, the court emphasized the objective
outcome of the sanctions and observed that despite the fact that the
importation of food, medical supplies, and equipment is exempted from the
U.S. sanctions, “it appears to have become more difficult in practice, since
the announcement of the measures by the United States, for Iran, Iranian
companies and nationals to obtain such imported foodstuffs, supplies and
equipment.”182
B.

The Procedure for Granting Licenses

The humanitarian exemptions have been mostly structured in a
manner which require prior U.S. government approval for transactions and
payments related to exempted supplies. The ambiguity, arbitrary nature, and
inconsistent interpretations of these exemptions have caused delays,
confusion, and, in some cases, denial of requests to export humanitarian
goods.183 The procedural difficulties in obtaining approvals for exempted

178

Id. ¶ 91 (“The Court is of the view that a prejudice can be considered as irreparable when the
persons concerned are exposed to danger to health and life . . . .”).
179
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180
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181
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182
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183
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supplies and the fear of prosecution under sanctions enforcement actions
impede the task of aid agencies184 and have resulted in many international
firms and entities refusing to sell humanitarian goods, thus significantly
affecting the level of access to life-saving medicine and food.185
A major factor in making the humanitarian carve-outs more
compatible with the effective protection of fundamental human rights has
been monitoring the procedure for granting licenses. Establishing uniform
criteria and definitions for these exemptions, as well as operational criteria
for sanctions committees, is of the utmost importance.186 CESCR, without
endorsing any proposal, notes that proposals should have a “more
transparent set of agreed principles and procedures based on respect for
human rights,” “authorization of agreed technical agencies to determine
necessary exemptions,” and the “introduction of greater overall
flexibility.”187
The European Union’s restrictive measures against Iran provide a
clear example of an increased observation for the trade of humanitarian
goods. The measures set a more relaxed licensing procedure when increasing
embargo measures. Initially, the EU Regulation of October 15, 2010,188
included only limited, weak humanitarian exemptions.189 However, the EU
Council later moved towards toughening the embargo against Iran and
adopted Council Regulation 267/2012, which was accompanied by the
introduction of a new mechanism for granting authorizations to ease
investment in “food, agricultural, medical, or other humanitarian
purposes.”190 The authorization regime for trade transactions was also eased,
by lifting the “appropriate end-user guarantees” and removing Iran’s
undertaking “not to use the goods or technology concerned . . . in

184

LARRY MINEAR ET AL., INST. FOR INT’L STUDIES, TOWARD MORE HUMAN AND EFFECTIVE
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proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for development of nuclear
weapon delivery systems.”191
The court’s order following Iran’s request provides guidance on how
humanitarian carve-outs should be drafted and enforced to meet human
rights requirements. In this context, the court found that merely providing an
explicit textual humanitarian carve-out or “licensing policy providing for a
case-by-case issuance of licenses”192 does not meet the humanitarian
obligation of the sanctioning state. Rather, “[t]he United States of America
shall ensure that licenses and necessary authorizations are granted.”193 The
court’s ruling was a further step in defining sanctioning obligations as
results-oriented rather than means-oriented.
One of the major elements when designing the humanitarian carve-out
is identifying a wide range of exempted goods and services. Prohibitions on
importing necessary medical equipment, such as incubators or catheters for
babies,194 or excluding certain pharmaceutical inputs from the humanitarian
exemptions adversely affect the production of medicine in the sanctioned
state.195 The adverse impact of these deficiencies significantly increased the
humanitarian impact of sanctions in countries such as Iraq,196 Yugoslavia,197
and Burundi.198 To address this deficiency, the CESR’s General Comment 8
highlights the proposal of having a “wider range of exempt goods and
services”199 in order to make sanction programs more compatible with
human rights obligations.
This element was not invoked by Iran in its Request, but it was
referred to by the court indirectly in its enumeration of humanitarian goods
and elaboration of further goods necessary for the safety of civil aviation. In

191
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its interim ruling, the ICJ provided that the United States “shall remove, by
means of its choosing, any impediments arising from the measures
announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation to the territory of the
Islamic Republic of Iran of (i) medicines and medical devices; (ii) foodstuffs
and agricultural commodities; and (iii) spare parts, equipment and associated
services (including warranty, maintenance, repair services and inspections)
necessary for the safety of civil aviation.”200
C.

The Removal of Any Impediment and Banking Payment

One of the main elements increasing the impact of sanction measures
is the control of the sanctioning state over a necessary chain in a transaction.
The United States’ leading role in financial markets and multinational
companies’ dependence on access to banking payment services necessary for
conducting humanitarian trade operations with Iran201 have had a major
extraterritorial impact on the importation of humanitarian goods to
Iran.202 The impact of banking sanctions, especially those blocking
transactions, have not only impacted the flow of humanitarian goods but also
prevented donations from foreign charities, including those approved by the
U.S. Treasury.203
Due to these impediments and banking difficulties experienced under
the previous Iran sanctions regime between 2010–2015, the Swiss
government, following the introduction of U.S. sanctions on May 8, 2018,
entered into discussions with the U.S. administration to establish a
humanitarian channel with Iran. 204 The goal of the Swiss government was to
seek “some sort of ‘certainty’ for banks involved [in humanitarian trade with
Iran] so that they will not be excluded from the U.S. market” and clarity on
the permissibility of “the transfer of Iranian-origin funds into the Swiss
accounts” when Iranian importers pay Swiss importers for humanitarian

200
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goods. Though these requests were consistent with existing U.S. sanctions
laws, they were blocked by the U.S. administration in 2018.205 In addition,
the U.S. administration took a step further in designating Parisian Bank,206 a
major Iranian bank handling banking payment for humanitarian trade, as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”).207 This decision came as a
big surprise to Iran’s humanitarian trade.
Iran’s request also stated that “‘sanctions” on the purchase or
acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes and on significant transactions related to
the purchase or sale of Iranian rial plainly impose restrictions on the making
of payments, remittances, and other transfers to or from Iran.”208 The ICJ
observed that “as a result of the measures, certain foreign banks have
withdrawn from financing agreements or suspended co-operation with
Iranian banks.”209 These foreign banks refused to accept banking transfers
and ceased all corresponding relations.
The court found that “it has become difficult if not impossible for
Iran, Iranian companies and nationals to engage in international financial
transactions that would allow them to purchase items not covered, in
principle, by the measures, such as foodstuffs, medical supplies and medical
equipment.”210 The court ruled that having “broad authorizations and
exceptions to allow for humanitarian-related activity”211 does not meet the

205

The Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (“SHTA”) finally opened in late January 2020 with
the purpose of assuring export guarantees through Swiss financial institutions on shipments of food,
pharmaceuticals, and medical products to Iran. Michael Shields & Humeyra Pamuk, U.S. Says First
Shipmens of Medicine to Iran Delivered Via Swiss Humanitarian Channel, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-iran/u-s-says-first-shipments-of-medicine-to-iran-delivered-viaswiss-humanitarian-channel-idUSKBN1ZT205.
206
Treasury Sanctions Vast Financial Network Supporting Iranian Paramilitary Force That Recruits
and Trains Child Soldiers, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm524.
207
Parsian Bank—along with three other Iranian banks: Pasargad Bank, Middle East Bank, and
Saman Bank—is unusual among Iranian financial institutions because it complies with FATF-reflective
standards on anti-money laundering procedures. For this reason, it was a major bank in handling sanctioncompliant trade with Iran. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, New Sanctions on Iran’s Parsian Bank Threaten
Humanitarian
Trade,
BOURSE
&
BAZAAR
(Oct.
16,
2018),
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2018/10/16/new-sanctions-on-irans-parsian-bank-threatenhumanitarian-trade.
208
Iranian Provisional Measures, supra note 12, ¶ 57.
209
Id. ¶ 89.
210
Id.
211
Id. ¶ 86.

338

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 2

minimum requirement for the protection of human rights. It ruled that the
United States “shall remove, by means of its choosing, any impediments
arising from the measures announced on 8 May 2018 to the free exportation
to the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran” of humanitarian goods.212
The ruling is a general obligation that could include any legal or
administrative hurdle that might adversely affect trade of humanitarian
goods. However, in this respect, the court singled out one of the most
important elements in the formation of trading transactions: banking
payments. Indeed, as seen previously, the United States has major leverage
over international trading systems through its control of banking payments.
Finally, the court ruled that the United States should ensure “that payments
and other transfers of funds are not subject to any restriction” insofar as they
“relate to humanitarian goods and services.”213
VI.

CONCLUSION

Economic sanctions are the most prevalent policy tools for
decisionmakers in international relations. They have been widely used by the
powerful and economically advanced states to enhance their foreign policy.
The global economic structure and complicated nature of international trade
relations have created a complex picture of countermeasures in the human
rights context. The general regression of social and economic rights, the
impact of economic sanctions on the trade of humanitarian goods due to
negative macroeconomic effects, and the significant increase in transaction
costs have made the merely textual legal carve-outs in sanctions an
insufficient policy for addressing these humanitarian consequences.
In this context, a sanctioning state, while not required to provide
direct humanitarian assistance to the sanctioned country, cannot be released
from its liability if it only limits its actions to the mere inclusion of textual
waivers for humanitarian goods in its sanction programs. The lack of clear
procedures for such carve-outs and their related payments, the fining of
major international financial institutions for facilitating payments related to
sanctioned economies, the approach of the sanctioning state in exerting
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maximum pressure on the sanctioned state, the structure of the sanctioned
economy, and the comprehensive nature and extraterritorial implementation
of domestic laws all play a role in enhancing the power of a sanction
program, and consequently affect the importation of humanitarian goods to
the sanctioned country.
The Order of the ICJ pursuant to the Alleged Violations of the 1955
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic
Republic of Iran v. United States of America) case established a legal
precedent in designing and structuring economic sanctions and humanitarian
carve-outs. Although the court bound its jurisdiction on the Treaty of Amity,
its decision concerning the irreparable damages of the reinstatement of U.S.
secondary sanctions on May 8, 2018 provides an insight into how a sanction
regime must be designed to be more compatible with human rights
obligations.
The Court ruling provided that a licensing policy, based on a “caseby-case” issuance of licenses, does not meet the humanitarian obligation of
the sanctioning state. The sanctioning state must, therefore, ensure that
licenses and necessary authorizations are “effectively granted.” In addition,
the court ruled for the insufficiency of the broad authorizations and waivers
regime and required that any impediment arising from sanction measures to
the free exportation of humanitarian goods to the sanctioned state must be
removed by the sanctioning state. To this end, the court, due to the United
States’ domination of the international financial system, highlights the issues
encountered by legitimate financial institutions with banking transfers. The
sanctioning state must ensure that the banking transfers related to
humanitarian goods and services are not subject to any restriction.
The more sanction regimes increase in strength and scope, the higher
the level of obligation of the sanctioning state in seeking the “protection of
fundamental human rights,” especially in relation to the civilian population
of the sanctioned state. This obligation goes beyond providing mere textual
exceptions and authorizations in sanction laws and regulations and shall take
into consideration the power of the sanctioning state and the effect of the
restrictive measures on the population of the sanctioned state. Therefore,
when it comes to U.S. economic sanctions, the United States, due to its
greater authority in global financial system, shall ensure that the banking
transfers related to humanitarian goods shall be made without any
restriction.
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